Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177228 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 34.2017
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set of matchings in the core. When all men are myopic and the top choice of each man is a farsighted woman, we show that the singleton consisting of the woman-optimal stable matching is a myopic-farsighted stable set. The same result holds when all women are farsighted.
Subjects: 
Marriage Problems
Stable Sets
Myopic and Farsighted Players
JEL: 
C70
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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