Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177226 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 32.2017
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper explores a voluntary contribution game in the presence of warm-glow effects. There are many public goods and each public good benefits a different group of players. The structure of the game induces a bipartite network structure, where players are listed on one side and the public good groups they form are listed on the other side. The main result of the paper shows the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. The unique Nash equilibrium is also shown to be locally asymptotically stable. Then the paper provides some comparative statics analysis regarding pure redistribution, taxation and subsidies. It appears that small redistributions of wealth may sometimes be neutral, but generally, the effects of redistributive policies depend on how public good groups are related in the contribution network structure.
Schlagwörter: 
Multiple Public Goods
Warm-glow Effects
Bipartite Contribution Structure
Nash Equilibrium
Comparative Statics
JEL: 
C72
D64
H40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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