Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177191 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11387
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper develops a simple general equilibrium model which establishes a link between the patience of economic agents and the well-being of nations. We show that firms in long-term oriented countries can mitigate hold-up inefficiencies by engaging with their suppliers in relational contracting – informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships. Our model predicts that countries with a higher level of patience will exhibit greater economic well-being and higher total factor productivity. We provide empirical evidence in line with the predictions of our theory.
Schlagwörter: 
time preferences
relational contracting
aggregate welfare
TFP
JEL: 
D23
L14
L22
L23
O10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.6 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.