Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/175235 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 798
Verlag: 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, London
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper proposes a rational model of voter participation by generalizing a common-value model of costless voting to include not just pivotal voting but also marginal voting incentives. A new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case, to avoid the marginal voter's curse of pushing the policy outcome in the wrong direction. The marginal voter's curse presents a larger disincentive for voting than the swing voter's curse. Moreover, marginal motivations are shown to dominate pivotal motivations in large elections. Model predictions are confirmed in a laboratory experiment and applied in a comparative analysis of electoral rules.
Schlagwörter: 
Turnout
Information aggregation
Underdog effect
Experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
D70
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
529.96 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.