Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/174027 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11117
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the long-run impacts of health insurance promotion in Northern Ghana. We randomly provide three overlapping interventions to promote enrollment: subsidy, information campaign, and convenient sign-up option, with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial intervention. Our interventions, especially the subsidy, promote enrollment and healthcare service utilization in the short and long runs. We also find short-run health status improvements, which disappear in the long run. We find suggestive evidence on decreased investment in disease prevention and selection that may help explain this pattern of health status changes.
Schlagwörter: 
health insurance
sustainability
moral hazard
selection
screening effect
randomized experiments
JEL: 
I1
O12
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
2.25 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.