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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
28th European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Competition and Regulation in the Information Age", Passau, Germany, 30th July - 2nd August, 2017
Verlag: 
International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Calgary
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we study how the coexistence of access regulations for legacy (copper) and fiber networks shapes the incentives to invest in network infrastructure. To this end, we develop a theoretical model explaining investment incentives by incumbent telecom operators and heterogeneous entrants and test its main predictions using panel data from 27 EU member states over the last decade. Our theoretical model extends the existing literature by, among other things, allowing for heterogeneous entrants in internet access markets, as we consider both other telecom and cable TV operators as entrants. In the empirical part, we use a novel data set including information on physical fiber network investments, legacy network access regulation and recently imposed fiber access regulations. Our main finding is that more stringent access regulations for both the legacy and the fiber networks have, in line with our theoretical model, an asymmetric effect on incumbent telecom and cable TV operators; both harm investments by the former, but do not affect the latter.
Schlagwörter: 
Internet access market
Access regulation
Investment
Infrastructure
Next Generation Networks
Broadband
Telecoms
Cable operators and Europe
JEL: 
L96
L51
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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