Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/167929 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 5 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 191-203
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281-298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership. The definition of the core is adapted analogously and the possibilities for the cross-cutting of contractual arrangements are illustrated and discussed.
Subjects: 
cooperative games
core
externalities
multiple membership
stability
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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