Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/161405 
Year of Publication: 
1991
Series/Report no.: 
Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel No. 275
Publisher: 
Universität Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Kiel
Abstract: 
In subjective expected utility (SEU) the decision weights people attach to events are their beliefs about the likelihood of events. Much empirical evidence, inspired by Ellsberg (1961) and others, shows that people prefer to bet on events they know more about, even when their beliefs are held constant. (They are averse to "ambiguity", or uncertainty about probability.) We review evidence, recent theoretical explanations, and applications of research on ambiguity and SEU.
Subjects: 
Ambiguity
uncertainty
Ellsberg paradox
non-expected utility
JEL: 
D81
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Document Version: 
Digitized Version

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