Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/158535 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 91-99
Verlag: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper proposes a mechanism to overcome the possibility that political parties may block the nomination of High-Court judges when the Parliament is involved in their nomination and theirmandate expires on a fixed date. This possibility arises when the default option is that the judge whose mandate expires holds office until an agreement is reached. Our proposal consists of changing the default option by a weighted lottery, related to the shares in Parliament of the different parties.We show that this mechanism is capable of solving the problem under reasonable conditions and implementing a politically balanced solution.
Schlagwörter: 
Negotiation
Political competition
Random protocols
Legislative bargaining
JEL: 
D72
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