Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/155037 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 84.1999
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we analyse a common agency model in which agents can choose with how many principals they want to work, while principals cannot condition contracts on the agent's decision to accept other contracts. In this case of "non-intrinsic" common agency we characterise the equilibrium. Unless the substitutability between the two outputs is very strong, optimality conditions for principals' contracts are the same as with intrinsic common agency. However, principals suffer from reciprocal competition, which with "moderate" substitutability increases the informational rent agents obtain in equilibrium.
JEL: 
L14
L41
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
452.64 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.