Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/153603 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 1169
Publisher: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
We study the impact of numerical expenditure rules on the propensity of governments to deviate from expenditure targets in response to surprises in cyclical conditions. Theoretical considerations suggest that due to political fragmentation in the budgetary process expenditure policy might be prone to a pro-cyclical bias. However, this tendency may be mitigated by numerical expenditure rules. These hypotheses are tested against data from a panel of EU Member States. Our key findings are that (i) deviations between actual and planned government expenditure are positively related to unanticipated changes in the output gap, and (ii) numerical expenditure rules reduce this pro-cyclical bias. Moreover, the pro-cyclical spending bias is found to be particularly pronounced for spending items with a high degree of budgetary flexibility.
Subjects: 
expenditure rules
fiscal discipline
spending bias
stabilisation
JEL: 
C23
E62
H50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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