Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150116 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 3 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2008 [Pages:] 367-382
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
A self-proclaimed expert uses past observations of a stochastic process to make probabilistic predictions about the process. An inspector applies a test function to the infinite sequence of predictions provided by the expert and the observed realization of the process in order to check the expert's reliability. If the test function is Borel and the inspection is such that a true expert always passes it, then it is also manipulable by an ignorant expert. The proof uses Martin's theorem about the determinacy of Blackwell games. Under the axiom of choice, there exist non-Borel test functions that are not manipulable.
Schlagwörter: 
Forecasting
calibration
zero-sum games
JEL: 
C72
C73
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
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