Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/149588 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series No. 16-11
Verlag: 
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual preferences. In this paper we present the results of an experiment on the influence of private payoff information and the role of the available alternatives on individuals' mechanism choices in such group choice situations. While efficient mechanisms are desirable, we experimentally show that participation constraints can prevent their implementation. We find strong indications that individual preferences for choice rules are sensitive to individual expected payoffs. Our results highlight the importance of considering participation constraints when designing choice institutions.
Schlagwörter: 
Experimental economics
Group choice
Choice rules
Mechanisms
Participation constraints
Two-stage voting
Bayesian games
JEL: 
C91
C92
D70
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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