Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/149256 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6169
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a class of deceptively similar games, which however have different player sets and predictions that vary with their cardinality. The economic, biological, political, and psychological applications are many. The game-theoretic principles involved are compelling as predictions rely on weaker and less controversial epistemic foundations than needed to justify backward inductions more generally. Is the account empirically relevant? We design and report results from a relevant experiment.
Schlagwörter: 
backward induction
interactive epistemology
player set cardinality
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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