Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/148906 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2016/16
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper develops a model of risky investment in education under disappointment aversion, modelled as loss aversion around one's endogenous expectation. The model shows that disappointment aversion reduces the optimal investment in education for lower ability people and increases it for higher ability people, thereby magnifying the investment gap between them generated by the riskiness of education. Policies aimed at influencing students' expectations can reduce early dropout.
Schlagwörter: 
education
risk
disappointment aversion
endogeneous reference points
JEL: 
D03
D81
I21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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