Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/148272 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
SAFE Working Paper No. 154
Publisher: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
In order to better differentiate the drivers of corporations' actions, in particular shareholder wealth and stakeholder interests, the paper explores the significance of the comply or explain-principle and its underlying enforcement mechanisms more generally. Against this background, compliance rates with specific provisions may shed a light on companies' reasons for following the code. An analysis of these rates at the example of distinct provisions of the German Corporate Governance Code is therefore entered into. In light of the current corporate governance debate and the legitimacy problems that are raised, among the code provisions that exemplify these questions very well are those regulating incentive pay, severance pay caps, and age limits for supervisory board members. Their analysis will lay a basis for an answer to the question about what motivates companies to comply with the code. The motivation then paves the way to arrive at a further specification of the determinants of the regulatory evolution of the Code and the range of stakeholders and their concerns that enter into it.
Subjects: 
corporate governance codes
soft law
stakeholder
shareholder wealth
market enforcement
German corporate governance
supervisory board
incentive pay
severance pay caps
age limits
JEL: 
G38
K20
M12
M14
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
755.84 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.