Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/147937 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 10251
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Decentralized assignments in the education market have been increasingly replaced by centralized ones. However, empirical evidence on these transitions are scarce. This paper examines the adoption of centralized admissions in the Brazilian higher education market. Using rich administrative data, we exploit time variation in the adoption of a clearinghouse across institutions to investigate its impact on student sorting, migration and enrollment. We find that institutions under the centralized assignment are able to attract students with substantially higher test scores and that geographical mobility of admitted students increases. While there are no sizable effects on final enrollment rates, search is intensified. Overall, our findings indicate positive impacts of centralization on the college market.
Subjects: 
test scores
college admission
centralized matching
higher education
migration
enrollment
JEL: 
D47
I23
I28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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