Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/146639 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 32-2016
Publisher: 
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics, Marburg
Abstract: 
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority.
Subjects: 
Collusion
Coordinated Effects
Minority Shareholdings
Merger Control
Unilateral Effects
JEL: 
G34
K21
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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