Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/144191 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] DIW Economic Bulletin [ISSN:] 2192-7219 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 28 [Publisher:] Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) [Place:] Berlin [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 311-317
Publisher: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Abstract: 
Under an open access policy, incumbent broadband providers in all EU countries are required to let new market entrants access their networks through bitstream or local loop unbundling (LLU). This type of regulatory provision aims to increase competition among all broadband providers, and is strongly recommended in markets where the prohibitively high cost of setting up a distribution network means that market power is concentrated in the hands of a few players - or even one single player (such as in the case of telecommunications). This analysis uses data from the UK to investigate whether such a policy stimulates market entry and broadband penetration and/or leads to an increase in broadband quality. In contrast to what is commonly believed LLU does not increase internet penetration significantly or sustainably. It does, however, stimulate market entry as well as investments that substantially increase service quality. Thus this open access policy does not contribute to a digital divide in access. Although these results are based solely on experiences in the UK, they do point to the general advantages of infrastructure-based competition (based on LLU) over service-based competition (based on bitstream).
Subjects: 
regulation
competition
entry
telecommunications
broadband
local loop unbundling
JEL: 
D22
K23
L43
L51
L96
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
177.33 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.