Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/140628 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 16-040
Publisher: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Abstract: 
This paper reports the results from a large-scale laboratory experiment investigating the impact of tournament incentives and wage gifts on creativity. We find that tournaments substantially increase creative output, with no evidence for crowding out of intrinsic motivation. By comparison, wage gifts are ineffective. Additional treatments show that it is the uncertain mapping between effort and output that inhibits reciprocity. This uncertainty is prevalent in creative and other complex tasks. Our findings provide a rationale for the frequent use of tournaments when seeking to motivate creative output.
Subjects: 
creativity
incentives
tournament
reciprocity
experiment
crowding-out
JEL: 
C91
D03
J33
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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