Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/130350 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 9666
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a model to understand the trade-offs faced by an elected representative in supporting an amnesty when a restrictive immigration policy is in place. We show that an amnesty is more desirable the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on the voting behavior of U.S. Congressmen on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provides strong support for the predictions of our theoretical model.
Schlagwörter: 
migration policy
amnesties
democracy
roll call votes
JEL: 
F22
O51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
900.11 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.