Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/127306 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 487
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that only those outcomes which are still possible can matter for updated preferences. We test the descriptive validity of these rationality arguments with a dynamic version of Ellsberg's three color experiment and find that subjects act more often in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency.
Schlagwörter: 
Non expected utility preferences
ambiguity
updating
dynamic consistency
consequentialism
JEL: 
D81
C91
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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