Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/127227 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 419
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data pro- vide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional. Rather individuals propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.
Schlagwörter: 
Evolutionary game theory
Stochastic stability
Imita- tion
Cournot markets
Information
Experiments
Simulations
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
D43
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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