Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/124898 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 9388
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a theoretical model to identify and compare partial and equilibrium effects of uncertainty and the magnitude of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when the other side's behavior is exogenously given. Equilibrium effects account for the interdependency of these decisions. This interdependency is important since, in the case of legal uncertainty, higher fines may reduce the willingness to punish, which in turn reduces the deterrence effect of high fines. Using a laboratory experiment, we identify these effects empirically by means of a strategy-method design in which potential violators can condition their behavior on the behavior of potential punishers and vice versa. All our experimental findings on both partial and equilibrium effects are in line with the hypotheses derived from the theory.
Schlagwörter: 
deterrence
punishment
legal uncertainty
fines
laboratory experiment
partial and equilibrium effects
JEL: 
K14
K42
C91
D64
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
663.27 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.