Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/122066 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 726
Verlag: 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, London
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be approximated by equal-treatment e-cores of the games themselves. Our proof is novel in that we rely on a fixed point theorem.
Schlagwörter: 
NTU games
Core
Approximate cores
Small group effectiveness
Coalition formation
Payoff dependent balancedness
JEL: 
C71
C78
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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