Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/115116 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
NRN Working Paper, NRN: The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State No. 1411
Verlag: 
Johannes Kepler University Linz, NRN - The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Linz
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide first field evidence on evasion spillovers as an important determinant of the individual compliance decision. Exploiting discontinuities in a self-reported commuter tax allowance, we observe a substantial share of taxpayers misreporting their claims. Using exogenous variation in job changes we find that individual evasion decisions are in uenced by the compliance behavior of other co-workers, with job changers from low- to high-cheating companies starting to evade much more after they move. In contrast, movers from high- to low-cheating companies do not alter their reporting. The most likely explanation is information transmission, including increased knowledge about the possibilities for non-compliance.
Schlagwörter: 
Tax Evasion
Self-Reporting
Spillover Effects
Information Frictions
JEL: 
H24
H26
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
928.33 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.