Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/113974 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 73.2015
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry where production is polluting and R&D aims to reduce emissions ("green" innovation). We present an n-firm oligopoly where firms compete in quantities and decide their investment in "green" R&D. When environmental taxation is exogenous, aggregate R&D investment always increases with the number of firms in the industry. Next we analyse the case where the emission tax is set endogenously by a regulator (committed or time-consistent) with the aim to maximise social welfare. We show that an inverted-U relationship exists between aggregate R&D and industry size under reasonable conditions, and is driven by the presence of R&D spillovers.
Schlagwörter: 
"Green" R&D
R&D Spillovers
Emission Taxation
Time-Consistent Emission Tax
Pre-Commited Emission Tax
JEL: 
Q55
Q56
O30
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.12 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.