Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/112963 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Contracts No. A12-V1
Verlag: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents binary performance level (suc- cess or failure) depends on their invested research e ort, and their choice of a research technology that is uncertain in respect of its apt- ness to generate a success. While in the single-agent-setting the agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal s preferred technology choice, this is not generally true for the multiagent-setting. When technologies are mutually exclusive - only one of them will be suit- able for yielding a high output - we show that there exists a contract that aligns the principal s and the agents interests. However, under the plausible assumption of scientists free technology choice, our re- sults suggest that there is a bias towards mainstream-research: Agents choose promising technologies more often than socially optimal.
JEL: 
D82
D86
D83
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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