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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 192
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper reports the results of an experiment where asymmetric sellers of a product can obfuscate the market. We show that policy measures may have unintended effects of increasing obfuscation incentives. We find that policies that limit the effectiveness of obfuscation and policies that promote parity between firms can lead less prominent firms to increase their obfuscation efforts. Despite this unintended effect, however, the former type of policies is effective in boosting consumer welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
Experiment
Obfuscation
Consumer Protection
Behavioural Industrial Organisation
JEL: 
C91
D18
D43
L13
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-191-5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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