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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 143
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter ("2 < R < É") has countably infinitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accumulation. With contestants randomizing over a non-convex set, there is a cost of being "halfhearted," which is absent from both the lottery contest and the all-pay auction. Numerical bid distributions are generally negatively skewed, and exhibit, for some parameter values, a higher probability of ex-post overdissipation than the all-pay auction.
Schlagwörter: 
Tullock contest
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
analytical functions
JEL: 
C72
D72
C16
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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