Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108305 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2013/32
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
Since Kreps and Scheinkman's seminal article (1983) a large number of papers have analyzed capacity constraints' potential to relax price competition. However, the ensuing literature has assumed that products are either perfect or very close substitutes. Therefore none of the papers has investigated the interaction between capacity constraints and substantial local monopoly power. The aim of the present paper is to shed light on this question using a standard Hotelling setup. The high level of product dfferentiation results in a variety of equilibrium firm behavior and it generates at least one pure strategy equilibrium for any capacity level. Thus the presence of local monopoly power challenges one of the most general findings about Bertrand-Edgeworth competition: the non-existence of pure strategy equilibria for some capacity levels.
Schlagwörter: 
Duopoly
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition
Hotelling
Capacity constraint
JEL: 
D21
D43
L13
ISBN: 
978-615-5243-92-9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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