Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103010 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WIDER Working Paper No. 2014/086
Verlag: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents the case of World Bank support to the mass titling component of the Cambodia Land Management and Administration Project. This was a project for which there was clear national demand, as evidenced by the fact that the Cambodian government had already attempted to implement mass titling a decade previously, but had lacked the human and technical resources to complete it. The case describes a consensus between donors and a host nation government during the planning and approval of the intervention, which dissolves into conflict during implementation. Ultimately, the case raises questions about the ethics of intervention. When governments want approximately the rules of the game suggested by donors (functioning institutions to facilitate markets) but do not want a level playing field, how should this be understood and resolved? Must donors always be passively complicit in elite projects until domestic politics hold them accountable to their own rules?
Schlagwörter: 
Social spending
human development
aggregate welfare
child mortality
developing countries
JEL: 
O29
P26
P32
Q15
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9230-807-0
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
599.23 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.