Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101984 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 48.2014
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that they are in the Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here.
Schlagwörter: 
Stable Matching
Competitive Equilibrium
Market Design
NTU Assignment Game
Roommate Problem
Coalition Formation
Bargaining Set
Bilateral Transaction
Gallai Edmonds Decomposition
JEL: 
C71
C78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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