Results 1-10 of 406.
|2007 ||A double moral hazard model of organization design||Berkovitch, Elazar / Israel, Ronen / Spiegel, Yossi
|2004 ||Identity and Commitment: Sen's Conception of the Individual||Davis, John B.
|2001 ||Social norms and optimal incentives in firms||Huck, Steffen / Kübler, Dorothea / Weibull, Jörgen
|2008 ||Cosmopolitanism, Assignment Duration, and Expatriate Adjustment: The Trade-Off between Well-Being and Performance||Grinstein, Amir / Wathieu, Luc
|2008 ||Transparency, inequity aversion, and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams: theory and evidence||Mohnen, Alwine / Pokorny, Kathrin / Sliwka, Dirk
|2010 ||Social norms and economic incentives in firms||Huck, Steffen / Kübler, Dorothea / Weibull, Jörgen W.
|2001 ||Social Norms and Optimal Incentives in Firms||Huck, Steffen / Kübler, Dorothea / Weibull, Jörgen
|2014 ||Analysis of a model of teamwork by Hill||Petkovski, Konstantin / Joshevska, Fanche
|2005 ||Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm||Luporini, Annalisa
|2001 ||Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device||Bovenberg, A.L. / Teulings, Coen N.