Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/96545 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ESMT Working Paper No. 10-007
Verlag: 
European School of Management and Technology (ESMT), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. Within this setup, we ask whether policymakers should interfere when better informed agents make individual investment decisions. We find that when the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be taxed. Conversely, any positive investment tax is suboptimally high if the public information is sufficiently unfavorable. We also show that an investment tax may increase overall investment activity.
Schlagwörter: 
information externality
strategic waiting
delay
information cascade
investment boom
optimal taxation
JEL: 
D62
D83
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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