Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/95901 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 18-2014
Publisher: 
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Marburg
Abstract: 
Trade unions are typically able to convert their industrial power into political power. We show that, depending on the parameter constellation, stronger trade unions may be welfare-improving in terms of an increase in aggregate employment and output, if they successfully lobby for lower trade barriers set by the government.
Subjects: 
Trade unions
lobbying
trade liberalization
JEL: 
F13
F16
J51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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