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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IUI Working Paper No. 568
Verlag: 
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters. Each party has a predetermined ideology drawn from some distribution. Parties choose a platform and campaign to inform voters about the platform. We find that, the farther away parties are from each other (on average), the less resources are spent on campaigning (on average). Thus, if parties are extreme, less information is supplied than if parties are moderate. We also show that if a public subsidy is introduced, we have policy convergence, given some mild technical restrictions on the public subsidy.
Schlagwörter: 
Political Parties
Campaigning
JEL: 
C72
D72
D89
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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