Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94028 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 314
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults to study information acquisition prior to an all-pay auction. If the decision to acquire information is observable, but not the informatio nreceived, one-sided asymmetric information can occur endogenously in equilibrium. Moreover, the cutoff values of the cost of information that determine equilibrium information acquisition are higher than in the first best. Thus, information acquisition is excessive. Incontrast, with open or covert information acquisition, the equilibrium cut-off values are as in the first best.
Schlagwörter: 
All-pay auctions
Conflicts
Contests
Information acquisition
JEL: 
D72
D74
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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