Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92720 
Neuere Version: 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 886
Versionsangabe: 
September 2013
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
Using an overlapping generations model, this paper describes interactions between naïve and sophisticated hyperbolic discounters in general equilibrium. The naïfes, who overestimate their future propensity to save and hence over-forecast the future equilibrium asset prices, are exploited through capital transactions by sophisticates, who correctly forecast the future asset prices by incorporating the naïfes' mis-forecasts. Due to the capital losses, the naïfe fall into bankruptcy when they are highly present-biased, highly patient, and having a low population density. Under generous conditions, the equilibrium is shown to be globally stable and Pareto inefficient in the ex-post sense.
Schlagwörter: 
Bankruptcy
Hyperbolic discounting
Naïf
Sophisticate
General equilibrium
JEL: 
D51
D91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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