Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/908 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1996
Quellenangabe: 
[Publisher:] Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) [Place:] Kiel [Year:] 1996
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 766
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
A mandatory open-network-provision (ONP) by dominant firms is the appropriate government regulation in the presence of network externalities. For basic telephone services and online services, a permanent ONP regulation seems indispensable, whereas telecommunication networks only require transitional ONP regulation as long as public or privatized PTTs dispose of a dominant market position. Regulatory institutions tend to prefer either cost-plus or price-cap contracts for defining appropriate price-ceilings for network-access under ONP regulation. In order to avoid the specific disadvantages of both, governments should better apply incentive contract schemes which allow a sharing of efficiency gains among producers and customers.
JEL: 
D82
L51
L96
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Dokumentversion: 
Digitized Version

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