Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/90787
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum No. 07/1998
Publisher: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Abstract: 
We consider competitive behaviour in sequential markets when current success or failure may affect the probability of future market opportunities. The analysis is conducted in a set up which may be interpreted as two private-value, sealed-bid, second-price sequential auctions. We demonstrate that whether agents price higher or lower than in the corresponding static context depends on the relative magnitudes of the 'winner's option value' and the 'loser's option value' of participating in the later market.
Subjects: 
auctions
JEL: 
D43
D44
D92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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