Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/89658 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4486
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the optimal protection strategy for an innovator of a complex innovation who faces the risk of imitation by a competitor. We suppose that the innovation can be continuously fragmented into sub-innovations. We characterize the optimal mix of patent and trade secrets when the innovator faces a strict novelty requirement and can only patent a fraction of the innovation once. We also study the optimal dynamic patenting policy in a soft novelty regime, when the innovator can successively patent different fragments of the process. We compare a regime with prior user rights, when the innovator can use the secret part of the process, even when it is patented by an imitator with a regime without prior user rights.
Schlagwörter: 
patents
trade secrets
dynamic protection of innovation
intellectual property rights
JEL: 
O31
O34
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
510.15 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.