|
EconStor >
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), Kiel >
Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/885
|
| | |
| Title: | | Investment specificity, vertical integration and market foreclosure  |
| Authors: | | Bickenbach, Frank Williams, Iestyn |
| Issue Date: | | 1996 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Kiel Working Papers 734 |
| Abstract: | | In this paper we consider the impact of vertical integration on a retailer's choices of product variety and specific, brand-supporting investment. In an incomplete contract environment, vertical merger encourages investment in integrated supply, and foreclosure of non-integrated manufacturers. Anti-competitive as opposed to efficiency interpretations depend delicately on a trade-off between the benefits of supplier-specific rather than generally applicable retailer investment, and the value of multi-product rather than single product retailing. Where retailers compete, it is shown that vertical integration implements competition reducing, product differentiating investment strategies. |
| Subjects: | | incomplete contracts vertical integration monopolization |
| JEL: | | L22 L12 L4 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW Economists Online
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/885
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|