Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/86620 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 05-075/1
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free riders. However, these types of emotions also trigger retaliatory behavior by the punished individuals. This makes the enforcement of a cooperative norm more costly. We show that in addition to anger, ‘social’ emotions like shame and guilt need to be present for punishment to be an effective deterrent of uncooperative actions. They play a key role by subduing the desire of punished individuals to retaliate and by motivating them to behave more cooperatively in the future.
Subjects: 
Emotions
Punishment
Retaliation
Counter punishment
Social Norms
Fairness
Cooperation
JEL: 
Z13
C92
D74
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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