Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85802 
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 03-033/1
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using thefact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium isunique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets.
Subjects: 
multi-store competition
hotelling
interlacing
JEL: 
I18
D10
Z13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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