Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85753 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 00-075/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R&D, and the architecture of collaboration networks. In the absence of firm rivalry, the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing, and efficient. By contrast, under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint. This suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links.
Schlagwörter: 
strategic alliances
networks
research and development
JEL: 
D21
D43
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
385.78 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.