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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1327
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
To date, the distributive implications of incentive regulation on electricity transmission networks have not been explicitly studied in the literature. More specifically, the parameters that a regulator might use to achieve distributive efficiency under price-cap regulation have not yet been identified. To discern these parameters is the motivation for the research presented in this paper. We study how different weight parameters affect the distributive characteristics of optimal price-cap incentive regulation for electricity transmission. We find that a regulator's use of ideal (Laspeyres) weights tends to be more beneficial for the Transco (consumers) than for consumers (the Transco).
Schlagwörter: 
electricity transmission
incentive regulation
distributive efficiency
JEL: 
L50
L51
L94
Q40
Q42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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