Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/83423 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IES Working Paper No. 19/2009
Publisher: 
Charles University in Prague, Institute of Economic Studies (IES), Prague
Abstract: 
The European Union (EU) is not de jure a federation, but after 50 years of institutional evolution it possesses attributes of a federal state. One can conclude that EU is something between federation and intergovernmental organization. If we measure something between by interval [0, 1], where 0 means fully intergovernmental organization and 1 means de facto federation, the questions are: What is the location of recent EU on this interval? What tendency of development of this location can be observed in time? In this paper we propose such a measure based on game-theoretical model of European Union decision making system.
Subjects: 
co-decision procedure
committee system
consultation procedure
European Union decision making
federation
intergovernmental organization
qualified majority
power indices
simple voting committee
JEL: 
C71
D72
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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