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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IME Working Paper No. 40
Verlag: 
University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics (IME), Esbjerg
Zusammenfassung: 
When abatement costs are uncertain, but correlated, and a country becomes pri-vately informed that costs are low, then unilateral actions serve as a signalling devise to reveal low costs and unilateral actions have the potential to trigger positive responses abroad. However, the country engaging in unilateral actions is the one with the highest expectation about the other countries’ reactions, and it might suffer from an effect like the winners curse.
Schlagwörter: 
International environmental problems
unilateral reductions
signal-ling costs
JEL: 
Q28
H4
D8
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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