Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/82735 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2003:10
Verlag: 
Uppsala University, Department of Economics, Uppsala
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance (UI) can be improved. We are particularly concerned with three instruments, viz. the duration of benefit payments (or more generally the time sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies, including randomized experiments, are in line with this conclusion.
Schlagwörter: 
Unemployment insurance
search
monitoring
sactions
workfare
JEL: 
J64
J65
J68
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
196.6 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.